We study distributed optimization in the presence of Byzantine adversaries, where both data and computation are distributed among m worker machines, t of which can be corrupt and collaboratively deviate arbitrarily from their pre-specified programs, and a designated (master) node iteratively computes the model/parameter vector for generalized linear models. In this work, we primarily focus on two iterative algorithms: Proximal Gradient Descent (PGD) and Coordinate Descent (CD). Gradient descent (GD) is a special case of these algorithms. PGD is typically used in the dataparallel setting, where data is partitioned across different samples, whereas, CD is used in the model-parallelism setting, where the data is partitioned across the parameter space.
Introduction
Map-reduce architecture [DG08] is implemented in many distributed learning tasks, where there is one designated machine (called the master) that computes the model iteratively, based on the inputs from the worker machines at each iteration, typically using descent techniques, like (proximal) gradient descent, coordinate descent, stochastic gradient descent, the Newton's method, etc. The worker nodes perform the required computations using local data, distributed to the nodes [ZWLS10] . Several other architectures, including having no hierarchy among the nodes have been explored [LZZ + 17] .
In several applications of distributed learning, including the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) [A + 18], federated optimization [Kon17] , the recruited worker nodes might be partially trusted with their computation. Therefore, an important question is whether we can reliably perform distributed computation, taking advantage of partially trusted worker nodes. These Byzantine adversaries can collaborate and arbitrarily deviate from their pre-specified programs. The problem of distributed computation with Byzantine adversaries has a long history [LSP82] , and there has been recent interest in applying this computational model to large-scale distributed learning [BMGS17, CWCP18, CSX17] .
In this paper, we study Byzantine-tolerant distributed optimization to learn a regularized generalized linear model (e.g., linear/ridge regression, logistic regression, Lasso, SVM dual, constrained minimization, etc.). We consider two frameworks for distributed optimization: (i) data-parallelism architecture, where data points are distributed across different worker nodes, and in each iteration, they all parallelly compute gradients on their local data and master aggregates them to update the parameter vector using gradient descent (GD) [BT89, Bot10, DCM + 12]; and (ii) model-parallelism architecture, where data points are partitioned across the features, and several worker nodes work in parallel on updating different subsets of coordinates of the model/parameter vector through coordinate descent (CD) [BKBG11, Wri15, RT16] . Note that GD requires full gradients to update the parameter vector; and if full gradients are too costly to compute, we can reduce the per-iteration cost by using CD, 1 which also has been shown to be very effective for solving generalized linear models, and is particularly widely used for sparse logistic regression, SVM, and Lasso [BKBG11] . Given its simplicity and effectiveness, CD can be chosen over GD in such applications [Nes12] . Computing gradients in the presence of Byzantine adversaries has been recently studied [BMGS17, CWCP18, CSX17] , but as far as we know, making CD robust to Byzantine adversaries has not received much attention. In addition to gradient descent, this motivates us to explore how to make coordinate descent also robust to Byzantine adversaries.
In this paper, we propose Byzantine-resilient distributed optimization algorithms both for PGD and CD based on data encoding and error correction (over real numbers). Our proposed algorithm differs from existing Byzantine-resilient distributed learning algorithms in one or more of the following aspects: (i) it does not make statistical assumptions on the data or Byzantine attack patterns; (ii) it can tolerate up to a constant fraction (< 1/2) of the worker nodes being Byzantine, which is information-theoretically optimal; and (iii) it enables a trade-off (in terms of storage and computation/communication overhead at the master and the worker nodes) with Byzantine adversary tolerance, without compromising the efficiency at the master node.
Our algorithms encode the data used by the m worker nodes, using ideas from real-error correction to enable tolerance to Byzantine workers. We develop an efficient "decoding" scheme at the master node to process the inputs from the workers, either to compute the true gradient in the case of gradient descent or to facilitate the computation at the worker nodes in the case of coordinate descent. We take a two-round approach in each iteration of both these algorithms. Our main results are summarized in Theorem 1 for GD and Theorem 2 for CD, and demonstrate a trade-off between the Byzantine resilience (in terms of the number of adversarial nodes) and the resource requirement (storage and computational/communication complexity). Our coding schemes can handle both Byzantine attacks and missing updates (e.g., caused by delay and asynchrony of worker nodes). Though data encoding is a one-time process, it has to be efficient to harness the advantage of distributed computation. We design a sparse encoding process, based on real-error correction [CT05] , which enables efficient encoding, and the worker nodes alternatively locally encode using the sparse structure. This allows encoding with storage redundancy of 2m/(m − 2t) (which is a constant, even if t is a constant fraction of m), and one-time total computation cost for encoding is O((1 + 2t)nd).
We extend our encoding scheme in a couple of important ways: first, to make the stochastic gradient descent algorithm Byzantine-resilient without compromising on the resource requirements; and second, to handle streaming data efficiently, where data arrives in batches (and we encode them as they arrive), rather than being available at the beginning of the computation; we also give few more applications of our method. For the streaming model, more specifically, our encoding requires the same amount of time, irrespective of whether we get all the data at once, or we get data points one by one or in batches. This setting encompasses a more realistic scenario, in which we design our coding scheme with the initial set of data points and distribute the encoded data among the workers. Later on, when we get some more samples, we can easily incorporate them into our existing encoded setup. See Section 6 for details on these extensions.
Paper organization. Our problem formulation and the main results, along-with the high level ideas of our Byzantine-resilient algorithms for both PGD and CD are given in Section 2. We give related work in Section 3. We present our full coding schemes for gradient descent and coordinate descent along with a complete analysis of their resource requirements in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. In Section 6, we show how our method can be extended to SGD and to the data streaming model. We also discuss applicability of our method to a few more important applications in that section. In Section 7, we show numerical results of our method: we show the efficiency of our method by running it on two datasets (moderate and large) and plotting the running time with varying number of corrupt worker nodes (up to <1/2 fraction). We conclude with a short discussion in Section 8.
Notation. We denote vectors by bold small letters (e.g., x, y, z, etc.) and matrices by bold capital letters (e.g., A, F, S, X, etc.). We denote the amount of storage required by a matrix X by |X|. For any positive integer n ∈ N, we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n]. For n 1 , n 2 ∈ N, where n 1 ≤ n 2 , we write [n 1 : n 2 ] to denote the set {n 1 , n 1 + 1, . . . , n 2 }. For any vector u ∈ R n and any set S ⊂ [n], we write u S to denote the |S|-length vector, which is the restriction of u to the coordinates in the set S. The support of a vector u ∈ R n is defined by supp(u) := {i ∈ [n] : u i = 0}. We say that a vector u ∈ R n is t-sparse if |supp(u)| ≤ t. While stating our results, we assume that performing the basic arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division) on real numbers take unit time.
Problem Setting and Our Results
Given a dataset consisting of n labelled data points (x i , y i ) ∈ R d × R, i ∈ [n], we want to learn a model/parameter vector w ∈ R d , which is a minimizer of the following convex optimization problem:
where f i (w), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, denotes the empirical risk associated with the i'th data point with respect to w and h(w) denotes a regularizer. We call f (w) := 1 n n i=1 f i (w) the average empirical risk associated with the n data points with respect to w. Our main focus in this paper is on generalized linear models (GLM), where f i (w) = ( x i , w ; y i ) for some differentiable loss function . Here each f i : R d → R is differentiable, h : R d → R is convex but not necessarily differentiable, and x i , w is the dot product of x i and w. We do not necessarily need each f i to be convex, but we require f (w) to be a convex function. Note that f (w) + h(w) is a convex function. In the following we study different algorithms for solving (1) to learn a GLM.
Proximal Gradient Descent
We can solve (1) using Proximal Gradient Descent (PGD). This is an iterative algorithm, in which we choose an initial w 0 ∈ R d randomly, and then update the parameter vector according to the following update rule:
where α t is the step size or the learning rate at the t'th iteration, determining the convergence behaviour. There are standard choices for it; see, for example, [BV04, Chapter 9] . For any h and α, the proximal operator prox h,α : R d → R is defined as prox h,α (w) = arg min
Observe that if h = 0, then prox h,α (w) = w for every w ∈ R d , and PGD reduces to the classical gradient descent (GD). This encompasses several important optimization problems related to learning, for which prox operator has a closed form expression; some of these problems are given below.
• Lasso: Here f i (w) = 1 2 ( x i , w − y i ) 2 and h(w) = λ w 1 . It turns out that prox h,α (z) for Lasso is equal to the soft-thresholding operator S λα (z) [Tib15] , which, for j ∈ [d], is defined as
• SVM dual: Jaggi [Jag13] showed an equivalence between the dual formulation of Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Lasso. Hence, SVM dual is also a special case of (1).
• Constrained optimization: We want to solve a constrained minimization problem min w∈C f (w), where C ⊆ R d is a closed, convex set. Define an indicator function I C for C as follows: I C (w) := 0, if w ∈ C; and I C (w) := ∞, otherwise. Now, observe the following equivalence
If we solve the RHS using PGD, then it can be easily verified that the corresponding proximal operator is equal to the projection operator onto the set C [Tib15] . So, the proximal gradient update step is to compute the usual gradient and then project it back onto the set C.
• Logistic regression: Here f i is the logistic function, defined as
, where u i = x i , w , and h = 0. As noted earlier, since h = 0, PGD reduces to GD for logistic regression.
• Ridge regression:
Since f i 's and h are differentiable, we can alternatively solve this simply using GD.
Let X ∈ R n×d denote the data matrix, whose i'th row is equal to the i'th data point x i . For simplicity, assume that m divides n, and let X i denote the n m × d matrix, whose j'th row is equal to
+j . In a distributed setup, all the data is distributed among m worker machines (worker i has X i ) and master updates the parameter vector using the update rule (2). At the t'th iteration, master sends w t to all the workers; worker i computes the gradient (denoted by ∇ i f (w t )) on its local data and sends it to the master; master aggregates all the received m local gradients to obtain the global gradient
Now, master updates the parameter vector according to (2) and obtains w t+1 . Repeat the process until convergence.
If full gradients are too costly to compute. Updating the parameter vector in each iteration of PGD (2) requires to compute full gradients. This may be prohibitive in some large-scale applications, 2 where one has to make progress (i.e., updating the parameter vector in the right direction) quickly, because each update gets delayed by computing the full gradient. In such scenarios, there are two alternatives to reduce this per-iteration cost: (i) Coordinate Descent (CD), in which we pick a few coordinates (at random), compute the partial gradient along those, and descent along those coordinates only, and (ii) Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), in which we sample a data point at random, compute the gradient on that point, and descent along that direction. These are discussed in Section 2.2 and Section 6.1, respectively.
Coordinate Descent
For clear exposition of the ideas, we focus on the non-regularized empirical risk minimization from (1) for learning a generalized linear model (GLM). This can be generalized to objectives with (non-)differentiable regularizers [BKBG11, ST11] . Let X ∈ R n×d denote the data matrix and y ∈ R n the corresponding label vector. To make it distinct from the last section, we denote the objective function by φ and write it as φ(Xw; y) to emphasize that we want to learn a GLM, where the objective function depends on the data points only through their inner products with the parameter vector. Formally, we want to optimize 3
For U ⊆ [d], we write ∇ U φ(Xw; y) to denote the gradient of φ(Xw; y) with respect to w U , where w U denotes the |U|-length vector obtained by restricting w to the coordinates in U. To make the notation less cluttered, let φ (Xw; y) denote the n-length vector, whose i'th entry is equal to ( x i , w ; y i ) := ∂ ∂u (u; y i )| u= x i ,w . Note that ∇φ(Xw; y) = X T φ (Xw; y) and that ∇ U φ(Xw; y) = X T U φ (Xw; y), where X U denotes the n × |U| matrix obtained by restricting the column indices of X to the elements in U.
Coordinate descent (CD) is an iterative algorithm, where, in each iteration, we choose a set of coordinates and update only those coordinates (while keeping the other coordinates fixed). In distributed CD, we take advantage of the parallel architecture to improve the running time of (centralized) CD. In the distributed setting, we divide the data matrix vertically into m parts and store the i'th part at the i'th worker node. Concretely, assume, for simplicity, that m divides d.
where each X i is an n × (d/m) matrix and each w i is length d/m vector. Each worker i stores X i and is responsible for updating (a few coordinates of) w i -hence the terminology, model-parallelism. We can store the label vector y either with the master or with the workers. In coordinate descent, since we update only a few coordinates in each round, there are a few options on how to update these coordinates in a distributed manner: Subset of workers: Master picks a subset S ⊂ [m] of workers and asks them to update their w i 's [RT16] . This may not be good in the adversarial setting, because if only a small subset of workers are updating their parameters, the adversary can corrupt those workers and disrupt the computation.
Subset of coordinates for all workers: All the worker nodes update only a subset of the coordinates of their local parameter vector w i 's. Master can (deterministically or randomly) pick a subset U (which may or may not be different for all workers) of f ≤ d/m coordinates and asks each worker to updates only those coordinates. If master picks U deterministically, it can cycle through and update all coordinates of the parameter vector in d/mf iterations.
In Algorithm 1 on page 6, we give the distributed CD algorithm with the second approach, where all the worker nodes update the coordinates of their local parameter vectors for a single subset U. We will adopt this approach in our method to make the distributed CD Byzantine-resilient. Let r = d/m.
, where X ij is the j'th column of X i . For any i ∈ [m] and U ⊆ [r], let w iU denote the |U|-length vector that is obtained from w i by restricting its entries to the coordinates in U; similarly, let X iU denote the n × |U| matrix obtained by restricting the column indices of X i to the elements in U.
In Algorithm 1, for each worker i to update w i according to (6), where the partial gradient of φ with respect to w iU is equal to ∇ iU φ(Xw; y) = X T iU φ ( m j=1 X j w j ; y) and worker i has only (X i , w i ), every other worker j sends X j w j to the master, who computes φ ( m j=1 X j w j ; y) (see Footnote 2) and sends it back to all the workers. Observe that, even if one worker is corrupt, it can send an adversarially chosen vector to make the computation at the master deviate arbitrarily from the desired computation, which may adversely affect the update at all the worker nodes subsequently. 4 Similarly, corrupt workers can send adversarially chosen information to affect the stopping criterion. 
while keeping the other coordinates of w i unchanged, and sends the updated w i to the master, which can check for the stopping criteria.
Adversary Model
We want to perform the distributed computation described in Section 2.1, 2.2 under adversarial attacks, where the corrupt nodes may provide erroneous vectors to the master node. Our adversarial model is described next.
Adversary model. In our adversarial model, the adversary can corrupt t of the worker nodes 7 , and the compromised nodes may arbitrarily deviate from their pre-specified programs. If a worker i is corrupt, then instead of sending the true vector, it may send an arbitrary vector to disrupt the computation. We refer to the corrupt nodes as erroneous or under the Byzantine attack. We can handle asynchronous updates, by dropping the straggling nodes beyond a specified delay, and still compute the correct gradient due to encoding. Therefore we treat updates from these nodes as being "erased". We refer to these as erasures/stragglers. For every worker i that sends a message to the master, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the master receives u i + e i , where u i is the true vector, and e i = 0 if the i'th node is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary. We denote the set of worker nodes under the Byzantine attack by A 1 and straggling worker nodes by A 2 , where
for some s, t that we will decide later. The adversarial nodes can collude, and can even know the data of other workers. The master node does not know which t worker nodes are corrupted, but knows t, the maximum possible number of adversarial nodes. We propose a method that mitigates the effects of both of these anomalies.
Remark 1. A well-studied problem is that of asynchronous distributed optimization, where the workers can have different delays in updates [DB13] . One mechanism to deal with this is to wait for a subset of responses, before proceeding to the next iteration, treating the others as missing (or erasures) [KSDY17] . Byzantine attacks are quite distinct from such erasures, as the adversary can report wrong local gradients, requiring the master node to create mechanisms to overcome such attacks. If the master node simply aggregates the collected updates as in (4), the computed gradient could be arbitrarily far away from the true one, even with a single adversary [MGR18] .
5 After the 1st iteration, worker i need not multiply Xi with wi to obtain Xiwi in every iteration; as only a few coordinates of wi are updated, it only needs to multiply those columns of Xi that corresponds to the updated coordinates of wi.
6 Note that even after computing Xw, master needs access to the labels yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n to compute φ (Xw; y). Since y ∈ R n is just a vector, we can either store that at master, or, alternatively, we can encode y distributedly at the workers and master can recover that using the method developed in Section 4 for Byzantine-resilient distributed matrix-vector multiplication, where the matrix is an identity matrix and vector is equal to y.
7 Our results also apply to a slightly different adversarial model, where the adversary can adaptively choose which of the t worker nodes to attack at each iteration. However, in this model, the adversary cannot modify the local stored data of the attacked node, as otherwise, over time, it can corrupt all the data, making any defense impossible.
Our Approach to Gradient Computation
Recall that f i (w) = ( x i , w ; y i ) for some differentiable loss function , and the gradient of f i at w is equal to ∇f i (w) = (x i ) T ( x i , w ; y i ), where ( x i , w ; y i ) := ∂ ∂u (u; y i )| u= x i ,w . Note that ∇f i (w) ∈ R d is a column vector. Let f (w) denote the n-length vector whose i'th entry is equal to ( x i , w ; y i ). With this notation, since
Since n is a constant, it is enough to compute X T f (w). So, for simplicity, in the rest of the paper we write
A natural approach to computing the gradient ∇f (w) is to compute it in two rounds: (i) compute f (w) in the 1st round by first multiplying X with w and then master locally computes f (w) from Xw (master can do this locally, because Xw is an n-dimensional vector whose i'th entry is equal to x i , w and (f (w)) i = ( x i , w ; y i )); 8 and (ii) compute ∇f (w) = X T f (w) in the 2nd round by multiplying X T with f (w). So, the task of each gradient computation reduces to two matrix-vector (MV) multiplications, where the matrices are fixed and vectors may be different each time. To combat against the adversarial worker nodes, we do both of these MV multiplications using data encoding and real-error correction; see Figure 1 for a pictorial description of our approach. More specifically, for the 1st round, we encode X using a sparse encoding matrix
(1) i X at the i'th worker node; and for the 2nd round, we encode X T using another sparse encoding matrix
and store S
(2) i X T at the i'th worker node. Now, in the 1st round of the gradient computation at w, the master node broadcasts w and the i'th worker node replies with S
(1) i Xw (a corrupt worker may report an arbitrary vector); upon receiving all the vectors, the master node applies error-correction procedure to recover Xw and then locally computes f (w) as described above; in the 2nd round, the master node broadcasts f (w) and similarly can recover X T f (w) (which is equal to the gradient) at the end of the 2nd round. So, it suffices to devise a method for multiplying a vector v to a fixed matrix A in a distributed and adversarial setting. Since this is a linear operation, we can apply error correcting codes over real numbers to perform this task. We describe it briefly below. 
, where e i = 0 if the i'th worker is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary. Note that at most t of the e i 's can be non-zero. Responses from the workers can be combined as v T B + e T . Since every row of B is a codeword, v T B = v T A T G is also a codeword. Therefore, one can take any off-the-shelf decoding algorithm for the code whose generator matrix is G and obtain v T A T . For example, we can use Reed-Solomon codes (over real numbers) for this purpose, which only incurs a constant storage overhead and tolerates optimal number of corruptions (up to <1/2). Note that we need fast decoding, as it is performed in every iteration of the gradient computation by the master. As far as we know, any off-the-shelf decoding algorithm (over real numbers) requires at least a quadratic computational complexity, which leads to Ω(n 2 + d 2 ) decoding complexity per gradient computation, which could be impractical.
The trivial scheme does not exploit the block error pattern which we crucially exploit in our coding scheme to give a ∼ O((n + d)m) time decoding per gradient computation, which could be a significant improvement over the trivial scheme, since m typically is much smaller than n and d for large-scale problems. In fact, our coding scheme enables a trade-off (in terms of storage and computation/communication overhead at the master and the worker nodes) with Byzantine adversary tolerance, without compromising the efficiency at the master node. We also want encoding to be efficient (otherwise it defeats the purpose of data encoding) and our sparse encoding matrix achieves that. Our main result for the Byzantine-resilient distributed gradient computation is as follows, which is proved in Section 4:
Theorem 1 (Gradient Computation). Let X ∈ R n×d denote the data matrix. Let m denote the total number of worker nodes. We can compute the gradient exactly in a distributed manner in the presence of t corrupt worker nodes and s stragglers, with the following guarantees, where > 0 is a free parameter.
•
• Total storage requirement is roughly 2(1 + )|X|.
• Computational complexity for each gradient computation:
-at the master node is O((1 + )(n + d)m).
• Communication complexity for each gradient computation:
-each worker sends (1 + ) n+d m real numbers.
-master broadcasts (n + d) real numbers.
• Total encoding time is O nd 1+ m + 1 .
Remark 2. We compare the resource requirements of our method with the plain distributed PGD (which provides no adversarial protection), where all the data points are evenly distributed among the m workers. In each iteration, master sends the parameter vector w to all the workers; upon receiving w, all workers compute the gradients on their local data in O(nd/m) time (per worker) and send them to the master; master aggregates them in O(md) time to obtain the global gradient and then updates the parameter vector using (2).
In our scheme (i) the total storage requirement is O(1 + ) factor more; 9 (see also Remark 4) (ii) the amount of computation at each worker node is O(1 + ) factor more; (iii) the amount of computation at the master node is O((1+ )(1+ n d )) factor more, which is comparable in cases where n is not much bigger than d; (iv) master broadcasts (1 + n d ) factor more data, which is comparable if n is not much bigger than d; and (v) each worker sends O (1 + )
is not much bigger than d, and smaller than O(1 + ) -a constant factor -as long as n < O(dm).
Remark 3. The statement of Theorem 1 allows for any s and t, as long as (s + t) ≤ 1+ · m 2 . As we are handling both erasures and errors in the same way 10 the corruption threshold does not have to handle s and t separately. To simplify the discussion, for the rest of the paper, we consider only Byzantine corruption, and denote the corrupted set by I ⊂ [m] with |I| ≤ t, with the understanding that this can also work with stragglers.
Remark 4. Let m be an even number. Note that we can get the corruption threshold t to be any number less than m/2, but at the expense of increased storage and computation. For any δ > 0, if we want to get δ close to m/2, i.e., t = m/2 − δ, then we must have (1 + ) ≥ m/2δ. In particular, at = 2, we can tolerate up to m/3 corrupt nodes, with constant overhead in the total storage as well as on the computational complexity.
Note that when δ is a constant, i.e., t is close to m−1 2 , then grows linearly with m; for example, if t = m−1 2 , then = m − 1. In this case, our storage redundancy factor is O(m). In contrast, the trivial scheme (see "trivial approach" on page 7) does better in this regime and has only a constant storage overhead, but at the expense of an increased decoding complexity at the master, which is at least quadratic in the problem dimensions d and n, whereas, our decoding complexity at the master always scales linearly with d and n. If we always want a constant storage redundancy for all values of the corruption threshold t, we can use our coding scheme if t ≤ c · m−1 2 , where c < 1 is a constant, and use the trivial scheme if t is close to
Our encoding is also efficient and requires O nd 1+ m + 1 time. Note that O(nd) is equal to the time required for distributing the data matrix X among m workers (for running the distributed gradient descent algorithms without the adversary); and the encoding time in our scheme (which results in an encoded matrix that provides Byzantine-resiliency) is a factor of (2t + 1) more.
Remark 5. Our scheme is not only efficient (both in terms of computational complexity and storage requirement), but it can also tolerate up to m−1 2 corrupt worker nodes (by taking = m − 1 in Theorem 1). It is not hard to prove that this bound is information-theoretically optimal, i.e., no algorithm can tolerate m 2 corrupt worker nodes, and at the same time correctly computes the gradient.
Our Approach to Coordinate Descent
We use data encoding and add redundancy to enlarge the parameter space. Specifically, we encode the data matrix X using an encoding matrix R = [R 1 R 2 . . . R m ], where each R i is a d × p matrix (with pm ≥ d), and store XR i at the i'th worker. Define X R := XR. Now, instead of solving (5), we solve the encoded problem arg min v∈R pm φ( X R v; y) using Algorithm 1 (together with decoding at the master); see Figure 2 for a pictorial description of our algorithm. We design the encoding matrix R such that at every iteration of our algorithm, updating any (small) subset of coordinates of
automatically updates some (small) subset of coordinates of w; and, furthermore, by updating those coordinates of v i 's, we can efficiently recover the correspondingly updated coordinates of w, despite the errors injected by the adversary. In fact, at any iteration t, the encoded parameter vector v t and the original parameter vector w t satisfies v t = R + w t , where R + := R T (RR T ) −1 is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of R, and w t evolves in the same way as if we are running Algorithm 1 on the original problem.
We will be effectively updating the coordinates of the parameter vector w in chunks of size m/(1+ Theorem 2 (Coordinate Descent). Under the setting of Theorem 1, our Byzantine-resilient distributed CD algorithm has the following guarantees, where > 0 is a free parameter.
• If each worker i updates τ coordinates of v i , then -τ m 1+ coordinates of the corresponding w gets updated.
-the computational complexity in each iteration * at each worker node is O(nτ ).
* at the master node is O((1 + )nm + τ m 2 ).
-the communication complexity in each iteration * each worker sends τ + (1 + ) n m real numbers. * master broadcasts τ m 1+ + n real numbers.
Remark 6. We compare the resource requirements of our method with the plain distributed CD described in Algorithm 1 that does not provide any adversarial protection. In Algorithm 1, if each worker i updates τ /(1 + ) coordinates of w i (in total τ m /(1+ ) coordinates of w) in each iteration, then (i) each worker requires O(nτ /(1 + )) time to multiply X i with the updated part of
; (iii) each worker sends n real numbers (required for X i w i ) to master; and (iv) master broadcasts n real numbers (required for φ (Xw; y)).
In our scheme (i) the total storage requirement is O(1+ ) factor more; (ii) the amount of computation at each worker node is O(1 + ) factor more; (iii) the amount of computation at the master node is O((1 + ) + τ m n ) factor more -typically, since τ is a constant and number of workers is much less than n, this again could be O(1 + ); (iv) master broadcasts 1 + τ m (1+ )n factor more data, which could be a constant if τ m is smaller than (1 + )n; and (v) each worker sends τ n + (1+ ) nm factor more data, where the 1st term is much smaller than 1 as τ is typically a constant, and the 2nd term is close to zero as (1 + ) is always upper-bounded by m.
The Remark 3, 4, 5 are also applicable for Theorem 2.
Related Work
There has been significant recent interest in using coding-theoretic techniques to mitigate the wellknown straggler problem [DB13] , including gradient coding [TLDK17, RTDT18, CP18, HRSH18], encoding computation [LLP + 18, DCG16], data encoding [KSDY17] . However, one cannot directly apply the methods for straggler mitigation to the Byzantine attacks case, as we do not know which updates are under attack. Distributed computing with Byzantine adversaries is a richly investigated topic since [LSP82] , and has received recent attention in the context of large-scale distributed optimization and learning [CSX17,CWCP18,YCRB18,BMGS17]. These can be divided into two categories, one which have statistical analysis/assumptions (either explicit statistical models for data [CSX17, YCRB18] , or through stochastic methods (e.g., stochastic gradient descent) [BMGS17] . Our method gives deterministic guarantees, distinct from these works, but similar in spirit to [CWCP18] , which is the closest related work. Our storage redundancy factor is 2m/(m − 2t), which is a constant even if t is a constant fraction of m. In contrast, the storage redundancy factor required in [CWCP18] is 2t + 1, growing linearly with the number of corrupt worker nodes. 11 This significantly reduces the computation time at the worker nodes in our scheme compared to the scheme in [CWCP18] , without sacrificing much on the computation time required by the master node. Their coding in [CWCP18] is restricted to data replication redundancy, as they encode the gradient as done in [TLDK17] , enabling application to (non)-convex problems; in contrast, we encode the data enabling significantly smaller redundancy, and apply it to learn generalized linear models, and is also applicable to MV multiplication.
A two-round approach for gradient computation has been proposed for straggler mitigation [LLP + 18], but our method for MV multiplication differs from that, as we have to provide adversarial protection. The coding scheme in [LLP + 18] for straggler mitigation is using a general-purpose MDS code for correcting erasures, which is analogous to the "trivial approach" that we described on page 7 for Byzantineresilient gradient computation in handling erasures/stragglers. In contrast, we exploit the block error pattern and design efficient codes which have much lower computational complexity at the master node, without compromising on the storage requirement. Since iterative algorithms compute gradients repetitively, it is crucial to have a method that has as low computational complexity as possible, both at the worker nodes as well as at the master node. Data encoding proposed in [KSDY17] for straggler mitigation applies to both GD and CD, but only for quadratic problem. It achieves low redundancy and low complexity, by allowing convergence to an approximate rather than exact solution. As far as we know, making distributed CD resilient against Byzantine attacks has not seen much attention.
Figure 1 This figure shows our 2-round approach to the Byzantine-resilient distributed optimization given in (1) to learn a generalized linear model. Since gradient is equal to ∇f (w) = X T f (w) (see (7)), we compute it in 2 rounds, using a matrix-vector (MV) multiplication as a subroutine in each round. In the 1st round, first we compute Xw, and then compute f (w) from Xw -since j'th entry of Xw is equal to xj, w , we can compute f (w) from Xw (see Section 2.4). In the 2nd round we compute X T f (w), which is equal to ∇f (w) using another application of MV multiplication. For a matrix A and a vector v, to make our distributed MV multiplication Av Byzantine-resilient, we encode A using a sparse
T and distribute SiA to worker i (denoted by Wi). The adversary can corrupt at most t workers (the compromised ones are denoted in red colour), potentially different sets of t workers in different rounds. The master node (denoted by M) broadcasts v to all the workers. Each worker performs the local MV product and sends it back to M. If Wi is corrupt, then it can send an arbitrary vector. Once the master has received all the vectors (out of which t may be erroneous), it sends them to the decoder (denoted by Dec), which outputs the correct MV product Av.
Our Solution to Gradient Computation
In this section, we describe the core technical part of our two-round approach for gradient computation described in Section 2.4 -a method of performing matrix-vector (MV) multiplication in a distributed manner in the presence of a malicious adversary who can corrupt at most t of the m worker nodes. Here, the matrix is fixed and we want to right-multiply a vector with this matrix.
Given a fixed matrix A ∈ R nr×nc and a vector v ∈ R nc , we want to compute Av in a distributed manner in the presence of at most t corrupt worker nodes; see Section 2.3 for details on our adversary model. Our method is based on data encoding and real error correction, where the matrix A is encoded and distributed among all the worker nodes, and the master recovers the MV product Av using realerror correction; see Figure 1 . We will think of our encoding matrix as S = [S T 1 S T 2 , . . . , S T m ], where each S i is a p × n r matrix and pm ≥ n r . We will determine the value of p and the entries of S later. For i ∈ [m], we store the matrix S i A at the i'th worker node. As described in Section 2, the computation proceeds as follows: The master sends v to all the worker nodes and receives {S i Av + e i } m i=1 back from them. Let e i = [e i1 , e i2 , . . . , e ip ] T for every i ∈ [p]. Note that e i = 0 if the i'th node is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary. In order to find the set of corrupt worker nodes, master equivalently writes
as p systems of linear equations.
where, for every i ∈ [p],ẽ i = [e 1i , e 2i , . . . , e mi ] T , andS i is an m × n r matrix whose j'th row is equal to the i'th row of S j , for every j ∈ [m]. Note that at most t entries in eachẽ i are non-zero. Observe that
are equivalent systems of linear equations, and we can get one from the other.
Note thatS i 's constitute the encoding matrix S, which we have to design. In the following, we will design these matricesS i 's (which in turn will determine the encoding matrix S), with the help of another matrix F, which will be used to find the error locations, i.e., identities of the compromised worker nodes.
We
C.2 For any t-sparse u ∈ R m , we can efficiently find all the non-zero locations of u from Fu.
C.3 For any T ⊂ [m]
such that |T | ≥ (m − t), let S T denote the |T |p × n r matrix obtained from S by restricting it to all the S i 's for which i ∈ T . We want S T to be of full column rank.
If we can find such matrices, then we can recover the desired MV multiplication Av exactly: briefly, C.1 and C.2 will allow us to locate the corrupt worker nodes; once we have found them, we can discard all the information that the master node had received from them. This will yield S T Av, where S T is the |T |p × n r matrix obtained from S by restricting it to S i 's for all i ∈ T , where T is the set of all honest worker nodes. Now, by C.3, since S T is of full column rank, we can recover Av from S T Av exactly. Details follow. Suppose we have matrices F andS i 's such that C.1 holds. Now, multiplying (8) by F yields
for every i ∈ [p], where ẽ i 0 ≤ t. In Section 4.1, we give our approach for finding all the corrupt worker nodes with the help of any error locator matrix F. Then, in Section 4.2, we give a generic construction for designingS i 's (and, in turn, our encoding matrix S) such that C.1 and C.3 hold. In Section 4.3, we show how to compute the desired matrix-vector product Av efficiently, once we have discarded all the data from the corrupt works nodes. Then, in Section 4.4, we will give details of the error locator matrix F that we use in our construction.
Remark 7. As we will see in Section 4.2, the structure of our encoding matrix S is independent of our error locator matrix F. Specifically, the repetitive structure of the non-zero entries of S as well as their locations will not change irrespective of what the F matrix is. This makes our construction very generic, as we can choose whichever F suits our needs the best (in terms of how many erroneous indices it can locate and with what decoding complexity), and it won't affect the structure of our encoding matrix at all -only the non-zero entries might change, neither their repetitive format, nor their locations!
Finding The Corrupt Worker Nodes
Observe that supp(ẽ i ) may not be the same for all i ∈ [p], but we know, for sure, that the non-zero locations in all these error vectors occur within the same set of t locations. Let I = p i=1 supp(ẽ i ), which is the set of all corrupt worker nodes. Note that |I| ≤ t. We want to find this set I efficiently, and for that we note the following crucial observation. Since the non-zero entries of all the error vectorsẽ i 's occur in the same set I, a random linear combination ofẽ i 's has support equal to I with probability one, if the coefficients of the linear combination are chosen from an absolutely continuous probability distribution. This idea has appeared before in [ME08] in the context of compressed sensing for recovering arbitrary sets of jointly sparse signals that have been measured by the same measurement matrix. Definition 1. A probability distribution is called absolutely continuous, if every event of measure zero occurs with probability zero.
It is well-known that a distribution is absolutely continuous if and only if it can be represented as an integral over an integrable density function [Bil95, Theorem 31.8, Chapter 6]. Since Gaussian and uniform distributions have an explicit integrable density function, both are absolutely continuous. Conversely, discrete distributions are not absolutely continuous. Now we state a lemma from [ME08] that shows that a random linear combination of the error vectors (where coefficients are chosen from an absolutely continuous distribution) preserves the support with probability one. 
Note that, with probability 1, supp(ẽ) is equal to the set of all corrupt worker nodes, and we want to find this set efficiently. In other words, given Fẽ, we want to find supp(ẽ) efficiently. For this, we need to design a k × m matrix F (where k < m) such that for any sparse error vector e ∈ R m , we can efficiently find supp(e). Many such matrices have been known in the literature that can handle different levels of sparsity with varying decoding complexity. We can choose any of these matrices depending on our need, and this will not affect the design of our encoding matrix S. In particular, we will use a k × m Vandermonde matrix along with the Reed-Solomon decoding, which can correct up to k/2 errors and has decoding complexity of O(m 2
Designing The Encoding Matrix S
Now we give a generic construction for designingS i 's such that C.1 and C.3 hold. Fix any k × m matrix F such that we can efficiently find e from Fe, provided e is sufficiently sparse. We can assume, without loss of generality, that F has full row-rank; otherwise, there will be redundant observations in Fe that we can discard and make F smaller by discarding the redundant row. Let N (F) ⊂ R m denote the null-space of F.
We set b i 's the columns of the following matrix F ⊥ :
The following property of F ⊥ will be used for recovering the MV product in Section 4.3.
Claim 1. For any subset T ⊂ [m]
, such that |T | ≥ (m − t), let F ⊥ T be the |T | × q matrix, which is equal to the restriction of F ⊥ to the rows in T . Then F ⊥ T is of full column rank. Proof. Note that q = m−k, where k = 2t. So, if we show that any q rows of F ⊥ are linearly independent, then, this in turn will imply that for every T ⊂ [m] with |T | ≥ (m − t), the sub-matrix F ⊥ T will have full column rank. In the following we show that any q rows of F ⊥ are linearly independent. To the contrary, suppose not; and let T ⊂ [m] with |T | = q be such that the q × q matrix F ⊥ T is not a full rank matrix. This implies that there exists a non-zero c ∈ R q such that F ⊥ T c = 0. Let b = F ⊥ c . Note that b = 0 (because columns of F ⊥ are linearly independent) and also that b 0 ≤ m − q = k. Now, since FF ⊥ = 0, we have Fb = 0, which contradicts the fact that any k columns of F are linearly independent. Now we designS i 's. For i ∈ [p], we setS i as follows: where l = q if i < p; otherwise l = n r − (p − 1)q. The first (i − 1)q and the last n r − [(i − 1)q + l] columns ofS i are zero. This also implies that the number of rows in each S i is p = n r /q .
Claim 2. For every i ∈ [p], we have FS
Proof. By construction, the null-space of F is N (F) = span{b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b q }, which implies that Fb i = 0, for every i ∈ [q]. Since all the columns ofS i 's are either 0 or b j for some j ∈ [q], the claim follows.
The above constructed matricesS i 's give the following encoding matrix S i for the i'th worker node:
All the unspecified entries of S i are zero. The matrix S i is for encoding the data for worker i. By stacking up the S i 's horizontally gives us our desired encoding matrix S.
To get efficient encoding, we want S to be as sparse as possible. Since S is completely determined by F ⊥ , whose columns are the basis vectors of N (F), it suffices to find a sparse basis for N (F). It is known that finding the sparsest basis for the null-space of a matrix is NP-hard [CP86] . Note that we can always find the basis vectors of N (F) by reducing F to its row-reduced-echelon-form (RREF) using the Gaussian elimination [HK71] . This will result in F ⊥ whose last q rows forms a q × q identity matrix. Note that q = m − k, where k = 2t. So, if the corruption threshold t is very small as compared to m, the F ⊥ that we obtain by the RREF will be very sparse -only the first 2t rows may be dense. Since computing S is equivalent to computing F ⊥ , and we can compute F ⊥ in O(k 2 m) time using the Gaussian elimination, the time complexity of computing S is also O(k 2 m).
Now we prove an important property of the encoding matrix S that will be crucial for recovery of the desired matrix-vector product. . It is clear that for any two vectors u 1 ∈ B i , u 2 ∈ B j , we have supp(u 1 ) ∩ supp(u 2 ) = φ, which means that all the columns in distinct B i 's are linearly independent. So, to prove the claim, we only need to show that the columns within the same B i 's are linearly independent. Fix any i ∈ [p], and consider the |T |p × q sub-matrix S (i) T of S T , which is obtained by restricting S T to the columns in B i . There are precisely |T | non-zero rows in S (i) T , which are equal to the rows of the matrix F ⊥ T defined in Claim 1. We have already shown in the proof of Claim 1 that F ⊥ T is of full column rank. Therefore, S
T is also of full column rank. This concludes the proof of Claim 3.
Since S T is of full column rank, in principle, we can recover any vector u ∈ R nr from S T u. In the next section, we show an efficient way for this recovery.
Recovering The Matrix-Vector Product Av
Once the master has found the set I of corrupt worker nodes, it discards all the data received from them. Let T = [m] \ I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i f } be the set of all honest worker nodes, where f = (m − |I|) ≥ (m − t).
, where r i = S i Av + e i . All the r i 's from the honest worker nodes can be written as
where S T is as defined in Claim 3, and r T is also defined analogously and equal to the restriction of r to all the r i 's for which i ∈ T . Since S T has full column rank (by Claim 3), in principle, we can recover Av from (12). Next we show how to recover Av efficiently, by exploiting the structure of S.
. The repetitive structure of S i 's (see (11)) allows us to write (12) equivalently in terms of p smaller systems. 
Designing The Error Locator Matrix F
In this section, we design a k × m matrix F (where k < m) such that for any sparse error vector e ∈ R m , we can efficiently find supp(e). Many such matrices have been known in the literature (for recovering the vector e given Fe) since the work of [CT05] , that can handle different levels of sparsity with varying decoding complexity. Most of these are random constructions, which may not work with small block-lengths (in our setting, m may be a small number). Furthermore, they can only correct a constant fraction of errors, where the constant is very small. We need a deterministic construction that can handle a constant fraction (ideally up to 1/2) of errors and that works with small block-lengths.
Akçakaya and Tarokh [AT08] constructed a complex analogue of the Reed-Solomon codes from k ×m Vandermonde matrices F and gave an O(m 2 ) time algorithm for exactly reconstructing e from f = Fe, provided |supp(e)| ≤ k/2. Let z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z m be m distinct non-zero elements in R. We define F to be the following Vandermonde matrix (where k < m):
Below we state a result (specialized to reals) from [AT08] .
Lemma 2 ( [AT08]
). Let F be the k × m matrix as defined in (14). Let e ∈ R m be an arbitrary vector with |supp(e)| ≤ k/2. We can exactly recover the vector e from f = Fe in O(m 2 ) time.
Note that F is a k × m matrix, where k < m. Choosing k is in our hands, and larger the k, more the number of errors we can correct (but at the expense of increased storage and computation); see Section 4.5 for more details.
Resource Requirement Analysis
In this section, we analyze the total amount of resources (storage, computation, and communication) required by our method for computing gradients in the presence of t (out of m) adversarial worker nodes and prove Theorem 1. Fix an > 0. Let the corruption threshold t satisfy t ≤ ( /(1 + )) · (m/2) .
As described earlier in Section 2.4, we compute the gradient ∇f (w) = X T f (w) in two-rounds; and in each round we use the Byzantine-tolerant MV multiplication, which we have developed in Section 4, as a subroutine; see Figure 1 for a pictorial representation of our scheme. We encode X to compute f (w) in the 1st round: first compute Xw using MV multiplication and then locally compute f (w).
To compute X T f (w) (which is equal to the gradient) in the 2nd round, we encode X T and compute X T f (w). Let S (1) and S (2) be the encoding matrices of dimensions p 1 m × n and p 2 m × d, respectively, to encode X and X T , respectively. Here, p 1 = n/q and p 2 = d/q , where q = m − k. Since k = 2t (by Lemma 2), we have q = (m − k) ≥ m/(1 + ).
Storage Requirement
Each worker node i stores two matrices S where the first term is roughly equal to a 2(1 + ) factor more than the size of X. Note that the second term does not contribute much to the total storage as compared to the first term, because the number of worker nodes m is much smaller than both n and d. In fact, if m − k divides both n and d, then the second term vanishes. Since |X| is an n × d matrix, the total storage at each worker node is almost equal to 2(1 + ) |X| m , which is a constant factor of the optimal, that is, |X| m , and the total storage is roughly equal to 2(1 + )|X|.
Computational Complexity
We can divide the computational complexity of our scheme as follows:
• Encoding the data matrix. Since, for every i ≤ k and j > k, the total number of non-zero entries in S
(1) i and S
(1) j are at most n and p 1 , respectively (see Section 4.2 for details), the computational complexity for computing S Note that this encoding is to be done only once.
• Computation at each worker node. In the first round, upon receiving w from the master node, each worker i computes (S 
Our Solution to Coordinate Descent
In this section, we give a solution to the distributed coordinate descent (CD) under Byzantine attacks and prove Theorem 2. To make our notation simpler, we remove the dependence on the label vector y in the problem expression (5) and rewrite it as follows (this is without loss of generality in the light of Footnote 2 and Algorithm 1):
We want to optimize (15) using distributed CD, described in Section 2.2. As outlined in Section 2.5, we use data encoding and error correction over real numbers for that. To combat the effect of adversary, we add redundancy to enlarge the parameter space. Let X R = XR, where
with pm ≥ d, and each R i is a p × d matrix. We will determine R and the value of p later. We consider R's which are of full row-rank. Let R + := R T (RR T ) −1 denote its Moore-Penrose inverse such that RR + = I d , where I d is the d × d identity matrix. Note that R + is of full column-rank. Let v = R + w be the transformed vector, which lies in a larger (than d) dimensional space. Let
. Now, consider the following modified problem over the encoded data.
arg min
Observe that, since R is of full row-rank, min w∈R d φ(Xw) is equal to min v∈R pm φ( X R v); and from an optimal solution to one problem we can obtain an optimal solution to the other problem. We design an encoding/decoding scheme such that when we optimize the encoded problem (16) using Algorithm 1, the vector v that we get in each iteration is of the form v = R + w for some vector w ∈ R d . 12 It may not be clear why we need this, but as we see later, this property will be crucial in our solution. Now, instead of solving (15), we solve its encoded form (16) using Algorithm 1 (with decoding at the master), where each worker i stores X R i = XR i and is responsible for updating (some coordinates of) v i . In the following, let U ⊆ [p] be a fixed arbitrary subset of [p] . Let v 0 := R + w 0 for some w 0 at time t = 0. Suppose, at the beginning of the t'th iteration, we have v t = R + w t for some w t , and each worker i updates v t iU according to
where
We denote by R iU the d × |U | matrix obtained by restricting the columns of R i to the elements of U. Analogously, we denote by R + iU := (R + ) iU the |U| × d matrix obtained by restricting the rows of R + i to the elements of U. With this, we can write X R iU = XR iU . Now, (17) can be equivalently written as
In order to update v t iU , worker i requires φ ( X R v t ), where X R v t = m j=1 X R j v t j and worker i has only ( X R i , v t i ). Since v t = R + w t , we have X R v t = XRv t = Xw t . So, it suffices to compute Xw t at the master node -once master has Xw t , it can locally compute φ (Xw t ) and send it to all the workers.
Computing Xw t is the distributed matrix-vector (MV) multiplication problem, where the matrix X is fixed and we want to compute Xw t for any vector w t in the presence of an adversary. In Section 4, we give a method for performing distributed MV multiplication in the presence of an adversary. Now we give an overview, together-with an improvement on its computational complexity.
We encode X using an encoding matrix
where each L i is a p × n matrix with p = n m−2t . Each L i has p rows and n columns, and has the same structure as that of S i from (11). Worker i stores X L i = L i X. To compute Xw, master sends w to all the workers; worker i responds with L i Xw + e i , where e i = 0 if the i'th worker is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary; upon receiving {L i Xw + e i } m i=1 , where at most t of the e i 's can be non-zero, master applies the decoding procedure and recovers Xw back. We can improve the computational complexity of this method significantly by observing that, in each iteration of our distributed CD algorithm, only a few coordinate of w gets updated and the rest of the coordinates remain unchanged. (Looking ahead, when each worker updates v iU 's according to (17), it automatically updates w f (U ) according to (6) -for a specific function f as defined in (21) -where v and w satisfy v = R + w.) This implies that for computing Xw, master only needs to send the updated coordinates to the workers and keeps the result from the previous MV product with itself. This significantly reduces the local computation at the worker nodes, as now they only need to perform a local MV product of a matrix of size p × |f (U)| and a vector of length |f (U)|. See Section 4 for details.
Our goal in each iteration of CD is to update some coordinates of the original parameter vector w; instead, by solving the encoded problem, we are updating coordinates of the transformed vector v. We would like to design an algorithm/encoding such that it has exactly the same convergence properties as if we are running the distributed CD on the original problem without any adversary! For this, naturally, we would like our algorithm to satisfy the following property:
Update on any (small) subset of coordinates of w should be achieved by updating some (small) subset of coordinates of v i 's; and, by updating those coordinates of v i 's, we should be able to efficiently recover the correspondingly updated coordinates of w. Furthermore, this should be doable despite the errors injected by the adversary in every iteration of the algorithm.
Note that if each coordinate of v depends on too many coordinates of w, then updating a few coordinates of v may affect many coordinates of w, and it becomes information-theoretically impossible to satisfy the above property (even without the presence of an adversary). This imposes a restriction that each row of R + must have few non-zero entries, in such a way that updating v t iU 's, for any choice of U ⊆ [p], will collectively update only a subset (which may potentially depend on U) of coordinates of the original parameter vector w t , and we can uniquely and efficiently recover those updated coordinates of w t , even from the erroneous vectors {v are non-zero and may have arbitrary entries. In order to achieve this, we will design a sparse encoding matrix R + (which in turn determines R), that satisfies the following properties:
Figure 2 This figure shows our 2-round approach to the Byzantine-resilient distributed coordinate descent (CD) for solving (15) using data encoding and real-error correction. We encode X with the encoding matrix [R1 . . . Rm] ∈ R d×p 2 m and store X R i := XRi at the i'th worker and solve (16) over an enlarged parameter vector v ∈ R p 2 m . At the t'th iteration, for some U ⊆ [p2], the update at the i'th worker is v
, where
The first part of the figure is for providing φ (Xw t ) to every worker in each iteration so that they can update v t iU 's. For this, we encode X using the encoding matrix
The encoding has the property that we can recover Xw t from the erroneous vectors { X
, where at most t of the ei's are non-zero and can be arbitrary. We can make it computationally more efficient at the workers' side by observing that, in each iteration, only a subset of coordinates of w are being updated: suppose we updated v t iU 's in the t'th iteration, which automatically updated w to the workers -in the figure, to take care of a technicality, we let master broadcastw
, each worker i computes Xiw t f (U ) and sends it backs to the master. Since master keeps Xw t−1 from the previous iteration with itself, it can compute Xw t . The set of corrupt workers may be different in different rounds -the corrupt ones are shown in red color and they can send arbitrary outcomes to master. Once master has recovered Xw t , it computes φ (Xw t ) and broadcasts it; upon receiving it worker i updates v t+1 iU and sends it back. By P.1, this reflects an update on w t+1 f (U ) according to (19); and by P.2, the master can recover w t+1 f (U ) .
P.2
We can efficiently recover w t+1 f (U ) from the erroneous vectors {v
, where at most t of e iU 's are non-zero and may have arbitrary entries. Since v
, this property requires that not only R + , but its sub-matrices also have error correcting capabilities! Remark 8. Note that P.1 implies that for every i ∈ [p], we have |f (i)| ≤ d/p. As we see later, this will be equal to m/(1 + ) for some > 0 which is determined by the corruption threshold. This means that in each iteration of the CD algorithm running on the modified encoded problem, we will be effectively updating the coordinates of the parameter vector w in chunks of size m/(1 + ) or its integer multiples. In particular, if each worker i updates k coordinates of v i , then km/(1 + ) coordinates of w will get updated. For comparison, Algorithm 1 updates km coordinates of the parameter vector w in each iteration, if each worker updates k coordinates in that iteration. Now we design an encoding matrix R + and a decoding method that satisfy P.1 and P.2.
Encoding and Decoding
In this section, we first design an encoding matrix R + that satisfies P.1. R + will be such that it has orthonormal rows, so, R is easy to compute, R = (R + ) T . For simplicity, we denote R + by S. We show that the encoding matrix that we design for the MV multiplication in Section 4 satisfies all the properties that we want. 13 In the MV multiplication, we had a fixed matrix A and the master node wants to compute Aw for any vector w of its choice. In the solution presented in Section 4, we encode A and store S i A at the i'th worker node. Now, the master sends w to all the worker nodes, and each worker i responds with S i Aw + e i , where e i = 0 if worker i is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary. Once master receives {S i Aw + e i } m i=1 , it can run the error correcting procedure to recover Aw. To apply this in our setting, we take A to be the identity matrix, such that S i A = S i , and the master can recover w from {r i = S i w + e i } m i=1 , if at most t of the e i 's are non-zero. For convenience, we rewrite the encoding matrix S i for the i'th worker node from Section 4.2 below:
Here q = (m − 2t) and
Note that 1 ≤ l < q, and if q divides d, then l = q. All the unspecified entries of S i are zero. By stacking up the S i 's gives us our desired encoding
. . , b q } is a set of orthonormal vectors. This implies that S is orthonormal, and, therefore, S + = S T . By taking R = S T , we have R + = S. Now we show that S satisfies P.1-P.2.
Our Encoding Satisfies P.1. We need to show a map f : 
and for any U ⊆ 
which in turn implies that
Since S + = S T , we have S
. With these, our update rule v t+1 iU = S iU w t − α t S iU X T φ (Xw t ) 14 can equivalently be written as
Observe that (25) is the same update rule as (19), which implies that if each worker i updates v iU according to the CD update rule, then the collective update at all the worker nodes automatically updates w f (U ) according the CD update rule. Now we show that our invariant v t+1 = Sw t+1 is maintained. We show this by induction. Base case v 0 = Sw 0 holds by construction. For the inductive case, assume that v t = Sw t holds at time t and we show v t+1 = Sw t+1 holds at time t + 1.
14 We emphasize that we used S + = S T crucially to equivalently write our update rule v
. This follows because S + = S T and we take R + = S, which together imply that R [m] . This, together with the inductive hypothesis (i.e., v t = Sw t ), implies that
Since f (U) = f (U), we have from (22) that
It is clear from (25) that w t f (U )
did not get an update when we updated v t iU 's, which implies that w t+1 f (U )
. Substituting this in (27) gives
, which, by (22), yields S iU w t = S iU w t+1 . This, together with (26), implies
We already have from (22) and (24) that
Since (28) and (29) hold for every i ∈ [m], we have v t+1 = Sw t+1 . Hence, the invariant is maintained.
Our Encoding Satisfies P.2. If we let
then the collective update (24) from all the workers can be written as
It is easy to verify that for every choice of
is a full column-rank matrix, which implies that we can in principle recover the updated w 
where, for every i ∈ U,ẽ i = [e 1i , e 2i , . . . , e mi ] T andS i,f (U ) is an m×|f (U)| matrix whose j'th row is equal to the i'th row of S jU , for every j ∈ [m]. Note that at most t entries in eachẽ i are non-zero. Observe that
and {S i,f (U ) w t+1 f (U ) +ẽ i } i∈U are equivalent systems of linear equations, and we can get one from the other. Observe that (31) is similar to (8):S i,f (U ) is equal toS i (for the same i) with some of its zero columns removed; and adding zero columns toS i,f (U ) will not change the value ofh i (w t+1 f (U ) ). Now, using the machinery developed in Section 4 we can recover w t+1 f (U ) from (31) in O(|U|m 2 ) time.
Resource Requirement Analysis
In this section, first we give our algorithm developed for distributed coordinate descent in the presence of t (out of m) adversarial worker nodes, whose pictorial description is given in Figure 2 .
We use two encoding matrices L ∈ R (p 1 m)×n and , and R is used to update the parameter vector reliably despite errors. Here L is a full column-rank matrix and R is a full row-rank matrix. Initialize with an arbitrary w 0 and let v 0 = R + w 0 . Repeat the following until convergence:
• Computation at the master node. Once master receives {L i X(w
, applying the decoding procedure of Section 4 to obtain X(w
) from these erroneous vectors requires O(p 1 m 2 ) = O((1 + )nm) time. After that obtaining Xw t takes another O(n) time. Given Xw t , computing φ (Xw t ) takes O(n) time, assuming that computing ( x i , w t ; y i ) requires unit time, where x i , w t is equal to the i'th entry of Xw t . Upon receiving {v
time. So, the total time taken by the master node is O((1 + )nm + τ m 2 ).
Communication Complexity:
Suppose workers update τ coordinates of v i 's in each iteration. Then (i) master broadcasts τ m 1+ + n real numbers, τ m 1+ in the first round to represent w t f (U ) and n in the second round to represent φ (Xw t ); and (ii) each worker sends τ + (1 + ) n m real numbers, (1 + ) n m in the first round for computing Xw t at the master node and τ in the second iteration to represent v t iU .
Extensions
In this section, we give a few important extensions of our coding scheme developed earlier in Section 4. First we give a Byzantine-resilient and communication-efficient method for stochastic gradient descent (SGD). Second we show how to exploit the specific structure in our encoding matrix to efficiently extend our coding technique to the streaming data model. In the end, we give a few more important applications, where our method can be applied constructively.
Stochastic Gradient Descent
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [HM51] is another alternative if full gradients are too costly to compute. In each iteration of SGD, we sample a data point uniformly at random, compute a gradient on that sample, and update the parameter vector based on that. We start with an arbitrary/random parameter vector w 0 and update it according the following update rule:
where r t is sampled uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . , n}. This ensures that the expected value of the gradient is equal to the true gradient. Due to its simplicity and remarkable empirical performance, SGD has become arguably the most widely-used optimization algorithm in many large-scale applications, especially in deep learning [Bot10,RSS12,DCM + 12]. We want to run SGD in a distributed setup, where data is distributed among m worker nodes and at most t of them can be corrupt; see Section 2.3 for details on our adversary model.
Our solution.
In the plain SGD, we sample a data point randomly and compute its gradient. So, we give a method in which, at any iteration t, master picks a random number r t in {1, 2, . . . , n}, broadcasts it, and recovers the r t 'th data point x rt . Once the master has obtained x rt , it can compute a gradient on it and updates the parameter vector. Since master recovers the data points, we can optimize for non-convex problems also; essentially, we could optimize anything that the plain SGD can. Our method is described below. We encode X T using the d/(m − 2t) ×d encoding matrix S (2) , which has been defined in Section 4.5. For simplicity, we denote S (2) by S.
Note that the j'th worker stores S j X T . Let X := SX T , which is a d/(m − 2t) × n matrix, whose i'th column is the encoding x i := Sx i of the i'th data point x i . Using the recipe developed in Section 4, given {S j x i + e j } m j=1 , where e j = 0 if the j'th worker is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary, master can recover x i exactly in O((1 + )md) time. Our main theorem is stated below, a proof of which trivially follows from the recipe of Section 4.
Theorem 3 (Stochastic Gradient Descent). Let X ∈ R n×d denote the data matrix. Let m denote the total number of worker nodes. We can compute a stochastic gradient in a distributed manner in the presence of t corrupt worker nodes and s stragglers, with the following guarantees, where > 0 is a free parameter.
• (s + t) ≤ 1+ · m 2 .
• Total storage requirement is roughly (1 + )|X|.
• Computational complexity for each stochastic gradient computation:
-at the master node is O((1 + )dm).
• Communication complexity for each stochastic gradient computation:
-each worker sends (1 + ) d m real numbers.
-master broadcasts log n bits.
Unlike the two-round approach taken for gradient computation and coordinate descent, we give a one-round approach for each iteration of SGD. Observe the distributed gain of our method in the communication exchanged between the workers and the master: (i) master only broadcasts an index in {1, 2, . . . , n}, which only takes log n bits; and (ii) each worker sends roughly 
Encoding in the Streaming Data Model
An attractive property of our encoding scheme is that it is very easy to update with new data points. More specifically, our encoding requires the same amount of time, irrespective of whether we get all the data at once, or we get each sample point one by one, as in the online/streaming model. This setting encompasses a more realistic scenario, in which we design our coding scheme with the initial set of data points and distribute the encoded data among the workers. Later on, when we get some more samples, we can easily incorporate them into our existing encoded data. We show that updating (m − 2t) new data points in R d requires O ((m − 2t) ((2t + 1)d)) time in total, i.e., O ((2t + 1)d) amortized-time per data point. This is the best one can hope for, since the offline encoding of n data points requires O ((2t + 1)nd) total time. At the end of the update, the final encoded matrix that we get is the same as the one we would have got had we had all the n + 1 data points in the beginning. Therefore, the decoding is not affected by this method at all. Note that we use the same encoding matrices both for gradient computation as well as for coordinate descent. So, it suffices to prove our result in the streaming model for any one of them, and we show it for gradient computation below.
Theorem 4. The total time complexity in encoding all the data points at once, i.e., when encoding is done offline, is the same as the total time complexity in encoding the data points one by one as they come in the streaming model, i.e., when encoding is done online.
Proof. Let S (1) and S (2) denote the encoding matrices for encoding X and X T , respectively; see Section 4.2. For convenience, we copy over the corresponding encoding matrices S (1) i and S (2) i from (11) for the i'th worker node in Figure 3 .
Suppose at some point of time we have encoded n data points each lying in R d and distributed the encoded data among the m worker nodes. Now a new data sample x ∈ R d comes in. We will show how to incorporate it in the existing scheme in O ((2t + 1)d) time on average. i , it is obvious which column to add: if l 1 < q, then we add the
Figure 3 Figure 3a depicts the encoding matrix for the i'th worker node for encoding X, which is used in the first round of the gradient computation. Here p1 = n/q , where q = (m − k) and k is equal to the number of rows in the error recovery matrix F in (14), and l1 = n − (p1 − 1)q. Figure 3b depicts the encoding matrix for the i'th worker node for encoding X T , which is used in the second round of the gradient computation. Here p2 = d/q and l2 = d − (p2 − 1)q. All the unspecified entries in both the matrices are zero.
Remark 10 (What allows our encoding to be efficient for streaming data?). The efficient update property of our coding scheme is made possible by the repetitive structure of our encoding matrix (see Figure 3) , together with the fact that this structure is independent of the number of data points n and the dimension d -it only depends on the number of worker nodes m and the corruption threshold t. We remark that other data encoding methods in literature, even for weaker models, do not support efficient update. For example, the encoding of [KSDY17] , which was designed for mitigating stragglers, depends on the dimensions n and d of the data matrix. So, it may not efficiently update if a new data point comes in.
More Applications.
There are many iterative algorithms, other than the gradient descent for learning GLMs, which use repeated MV multiplication. Some of them include (i) the power method for computing the largest eigenvalue of a diagonalizable matrix, which is used in Google's PageRank algorithm [ISW06] , Twitter's recommendation system [GGL + 13], etc.; (ii) iterative methods for solving sparse linear systems [Saa03] ; (iii) many graph algorithms, where the graph is represented by a fixed adjacency matrix, [KG11] . In large-scale implementation of these systems, where Byzantine faults are inevitable, the method described in this paper can be of interest.
In most of these applications, the underlying matrix A is generally sparse, which is exploited to gain computational efficiency. So, it is desired not to lose sparsity even if we want resiliency against Byzantine attacks. Fortunately, our encoding matrix S is sparse (see (11)), which ensures that the encoded matrix SA will not lose the sparsity of A: Each of the first pk rows of S has at most (m − k) (where k = 2t) non-zero elements, and each of the remaining rows has exactly one 1. Since m is the number of worker nodes, which is very small, and we can take t to be up to m−1 2
, we have very few non-zero entries in each row of S (in the extreme case when 2t = m − 1, each row of S has only one non-zero entry). In a sense, we are getting Byzantine-resiliency almost for free without compromising the computational efficiency that is made possible by the sparsity of the matrix!
Numerical Experiments
In this section, we validate the efficacy of our proposed method by numerical experiments. We run distributed gradient descent for linear regression arg min w∈R d Xw − y 2 2 . Since we are computing the gradients exactly, (i) there is no need to check the convergence; and (ii) our algorithm will perform exactly the same whether we are working with synthetic dataset or the real dataset; hence, we will work with the synthetic dataset. We run our algorithm 18 with m = 15 worker nodes on two datasets: (n = 10, 000, d = 250) and (n = 20, 000, d = 22, 000). For both the datasets, we generate (X, y) by sampling X ← N (0, I) and y = Xθ + z, where θ ∈ R d has d/3 non-zero entries, all of them are i.i.d. according to N (0, 4), and each entry of z ∈ R n is sampled from N (0, 1) i.i.d. In each round of the gradient computation, the adversary picks t worker nodes uniformly at random, and adds independent random vectors of appropriate length as errors, whose entries are sampled from N (0, σ 2 ) i.i.d. with σ = 100, to the true vectors. n = 10, 000, d = 250, m = 15. In Figure 4 , we plot the total time taken (which is the sum of the maximum time taken by any single worker node and the time taken by the master node in both the rounds) in one gradient computation, with varying number of corrupt worker nodes from t = 1 to t = 7. Note that, when t = 7, we have = m − 1, which is the main cause behind the significant increment in time for t = 7. n = 20, 000, d = 22, 000, m = 15. In Figure 5 , we report separately, the maximum time taken by any single worker node and the time taken by the master node (together in both the rounds) for one gradient computation, with varying number of corrupt worker nodes from t = 1 to t = 6. Observe that the time taken by the master node is orders of magnitude less than the time taken by the worker nodes. 1.286 Figure 5 We run our algorithm with 15 worker nodes on a dataset with n = 20, 000, d = 22, 000, and report the total time required per gradient computation against varying number of corrupt worker nodes from t = 1 to 6.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied distributed optimization and learning in the master-worker architecture in the presence of a Byzantine adversary, who can corrupt up to t of the m worker machines, and the compromised machines can collaborate and arbitrarily deviate from their pre-specified programs. We focused on learning the generalized linear models (GLM) with regularization, and proposed a solution for proximal gradient descent (PGD) in the data-parallel framework and for coordinate descent (CD) in the model-parallel framework. Gradient descent (GD) is a special case of both of these algorithms.
Observing that applying general-purpose solutions to our problem may be inefficient (see the trivial approach on page 7), we exploit the problem structure and give a solution that is both generic and efficient, based on data encoding using sparse encoding matrices and real-error correction for decoding at the master node. We give a deterministic solution without making any stochastic assumption on the data. Our solution gives a trade-off between the corruption threshold and the computational/communication complexity & the storage required by our coding scheme. So, depending on the scenario, we can choose the parameters that work best. In particular, with a constant overhead on the computational/communication complexity and the storage requirement as compared to running the distributed PGD/CD (which do not provide any adversarial protection), our scheme can tolerate up to 1/3 of the corrupt worker nodes. We can tolerate up to m−1 2 corrupt worker nodes, which is information-theoretically optimal. In the case of gradient computation in GLMs, our method significantly improves upon a recent work [CWCP18] on the resource requirements, which essentially uses a repetition code (for gradient coding), incurring a factor of (2t + 1) in the storage/computation overhead at the worker nodes; see Section 3 for more details on the comparison. Since our encoding matrix is sparse, the encoding time complexity only incurs a factor of (2t + 1) more than what is required by just for distributing the raw data matrix among m worker nodes.
We extend our encoding scheme to also make stochastic gradient descent (SGD) robust to Byzantine adversary with similar guarantees as above. Since our encoding matrix is sparse, structured, and have repetitive entries, we can apply our encoding in the data streaming setting too. We show that, in this setting, where data points come in one at a time (and we encode them as they arrive), our encoding is as efficient as when all the data is available offline and we encode them all in one go. We also give numerical results to show the efficacy of our method.
